LANDSCAPE URBANISM

A Manual for the Machinic Landscape

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Mohsen Mostafavi, Christopher Hight, Lawrence Barth, Iñaki Abalos & Juan Herreros
James Corner, Florian Beigel & Philip Christou, Michel Desvigne, Jesse Reiser & Nanako Umemoto
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Architectural Association

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Edited by Mohsen Mostafavi and Ciro Najle

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Christopher Hight

Portraying the Urban Landscape: Landscape in Architectural Criticism and Theory, 1960 – Present

Miss X claims that she no longer has a brain or nerves or chest or stomach or guts. All she has left is the skin and bones of a disorganized body. These are her words.
JULES COTARD, 1891[1]

The Ethos of Landscape

Landscape urbanism ultimately suggests neither a new formalism nor a renewed emphasis on landscape in the city. It is not a theory of design, but promises to innovate at the level of *design practice*. It has emerged from a perceived crisis in which the traditional disciplines of architecture and urbanism are thought to be incapable of engaging the contemporary built environment. The urban milieu has altered so drastically in the past 50 years that the objects of architectural and urban knowledge – such as the 'city' – no longer exist as objects accessible to those fields. This is reflected in our terminology: we have moved from the city and suburb to what Paul Virilio calls the 'exo-city', something defined largely by what it is not, an exterior rather than a stable referent defined by a given body of knowledge. Like the shift from natural history to biological science in the nineteenth century, engaging with the recently emerged questions and problems requires a new organization of practice and knowledge. Only by producing new fields, methods and objects might we be able to understand the contemporary postmetropolis as a coherent entity. Thus, beneath the renewed interest in landscape lies an implicit assertion that bringing the design practices of urbanism and architecture into contact with that of landscape will rejuvenate all three. Previous professional identities and closed fields of knowledge are to be reformulated as a continuous landscape of transdisciplinary encounters, which in turn opens up new terrains of knowledge and possibilities for action.

1 Translated by Brian Massumi.

In this way, landscape urbanism offers, to use an unfashionable and misunderstood term, a design ethic. By this I do not mean a moral code, a legal standard or a 'green' mantra. Instead, I refer to ethos: a way of doing and a mentality which privileges certain values, norms, assumptions and methods, and which treats particular problems in particular ways. Most importantly, the ethos determines the way in which questions are asked. An ethos is not a definition or identity but a consistency in the manner of being, a mode of operation.

Moreover, landscape urbanism seems to require a certain type of ethos. Through his studies in the history of sexuality, Michel Foucault argued for the 'disassembly of the self' (*se déprendre de soi-même*), a position reiterated by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*. In spite of its formalist reception in architecture, this text is mostly an instruction manual on how to 'make yourself a "body without organs"'. Making oneself a body without organs is similar to Foucault's *déprendre*: a freeing, distancing or, more precisely, disassembling of the essential humanist subject.[2] Both require turning from a molar (essentializing, unified) humanist identity to molecular (differential, multiple) assemblages. Such disassembly occurs not by critique or deconstruction but by becoming other (an example Deleuze and Guattari provide is the 'becoming animal'). All these becomings and bodies without organs, Deleuze and Guattari argue, prompt a shift from an ethics based on a 'logic of the same', projecting a normative model of identity, to an ethics of difference and assemblage. To return to a Foucauldian formulation, such 'becoming' enfolds the interior of thought with the previously unknowable virtualities lurking on its exterior. They see the 'logic of the same' as a Platonic mode of thought that projects a normative but ideal model as the real, against which all things are judged as good resemblances (copies) or bad simulations (simulacra). Simulations are not bad copies, but those things which cannot be recuperated into a mimetic economy of the 'same' as model-copy. The 'body without organs', the 'becoming animal', the *se déprendre de soi-même*, are such simulacra. They undermine the power of the 'logic of same' to fashion subjects as resemblances of an ideal normative model. The point is not to shift from one identity or resemblance to another but to employ simulacra to undermine the entire model-copy economy of resemblance.

Whatever difficulties there may be with such a formulation, and even though Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari were speaking of the identity of the self in society, this ethos can be

2 This is why Foucault called Deleuze's work a guide to nonfascist living.

applied equally to the transdisciplinary project of landscape urbanism and the identity of disciplines. Architecture traditionally operates through an ethics of stasis, truth, wholeness and timelessness; urban planning operates via control, determinism and hierarchy. In contrast, landscape design appears to offer an ethics of the temporal, complexity and soft-control with a commensurable spatial and organizational repertoire. It supposedly disassembles the identity of the architect and the urbanist and opens their fields of knowledge to 'other' potentials. Landscape urbanism, if it is to be anything, must be understood as an attempt 'to constitute a kind of ethics [as] an aesthetics of existence'.[3]

To assess what is at stake in such an endeavour, I want to highlight the complex relationship architecture and urbanism have enjoyed with the idea of landscape, as well as the irreducibly complex conditions of landscape as a mode of operation. Landscape design cannot simply become a new model. Firstly, it shares a problematic genealogy with painting, over-determined by the picturesque and the pictorial. As a result, landscape has operated as a dangerous simulacrum opposed to the model of architecture. The simple inversion of this relationship leaves the polarization intact. In tacit recognition of this problem, the conversion of landscape design into a model for urban design is often accompanied by a shift in the idea of landscape from the picturesque to the operative. However, the attempt to remove the pictorial sensibility of landscape conserves the ethos of architecture, one which is highly suspicious of representation while at the same time wilfully oblivious to its function as its own model. Instead of rejecting, or rather repressing, the pictorial aspects of landscape and its debt to painting, I will offer a different genealogical reading that embraces this past as a means to dissemble the identity of architecture as model. In short, I would argue that a coherent discourse on landscape urbanism cannot be sustained simply by elevating landscape as a new model, for it is the ethos of the model and copy itself that must be problematized.

Landscape as Simulation: The Colonial Gaze of Architecture

The encounter between architecture and landscape design is not new. Marc-Antoine Laugier suggested that designing a park was fair preparation for city planning. Here, landscape design served as a training simulation for urban design practices.

However, during the twentieth century, the two fields were related through an odd

3 Michel Foucault, 'On the Genealogy of Ethics', in *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, 1954–84* (New Press: 1997), p. 254.

epistemological 'orientalism' whereby landscape design functioned as architecture's adjacent other.[4] Landscape was something to tart up a plan: provide relief from urban congestion (Central Park); 'humanize' its rationalism (Ville Radieuse); or otherwise soften the cold, hard logic of the architect or planner. However, while landscape was the object of the architect's discursive wanderlust, to his 'colonial' eye it appeared rather uncultured, indeed wild. If a discipline requires rules, logic and method, landscape design did not qualify.

Reyner Banham, for example, argued that while English landscape painting was a singular contribution to art, no such claim could be made for English landscape architecture.[5] Banham even avoids the term 'landscape architecture', referring only to the 'landscape movement' or 'scene', as if it were a hip counterculture. Lest we mistake this as tacitly endorsing landscape as radical politics, it is clear that for him not only is landscape design not art, neither is it a discipline or even a profession. Instead, landscape design is merely the constructed resemblance of landscape painting, not an autonomous practice.

In one sense perhaps Banham was correct. The concept of landscape as such was formulated in painting, and only later deployed in actual parks, nature and cities. If architecture refers to an origin in the body or primitive shelter – in other words, to a natural order – landscape finds a less authoritative origin myth in painting. Landscape design was a copy of painting, which was itself a copy. All landscapes, it might be argued, are profoundly picturesque.[6]

The ethos at work in Banham's negative inferences and his focus on landscape's origins in painting are telling. There is an implicit analogy between the inferiority of the landscape architect to the landscape painter and Banham's later distinction between the designer of good buildings and the architect proper (Banham's iconoclastic example is Hawksmoor-the-architect versus Wren-the-nonarchitect).[7] A designer depicts architectural order but does not operate as an architect at the level of order. It is the mode of operation that defines a discipline, he argues, rather than any quality of beauty, function or other such criteria.[8] The difference is that the designer merely attempts to represent the appearance of order, the truth function, the logic, that is actually installed by real architecture or in painting. His distinction is therefore primarily ethical rather than epistemological or aesthetic. The ethos of the designer makes reproductions, shadows, rather than models of order.

4 I use the term 'orientalism' in the manner of Edward Said, as the 'other' which plays a constituent part in constructing the identity of the imperial power. Obviously, however, I am taking a liberty in giving this an epistemological and disciplinary function.

5 Reyner Banham, 'Kent and Capability', in *A Critic Writes* (University of California Press: 1996); originally published in *New Statesman* 64 (7 December 1962), pp. 842–3.

6 Of course, architecture is an image of architecture before it is anything else.

7 Banham, 'A Black Box: The Secret Profession of Architecture', in *A Critic Writes* (1996); originally published in *New Statesman and Society* (12 October 1990), pp. 22–5.

8 For Banham, the interior of architecture is an obscure 'black box' or 'inner sanctum'; it is harder to say what it is than to recognize objects and practitioners who are not 'it'. For him, it is even possible to be a singular genius or masterbuilder and yet not participate in architecture as a discipline (think of Gaudí or, apparently, Wren). In this regard, Banham allows a few isolated examples of landscape design to be designated as 'art'.

This analogy becomes more evident in Banham's description of Wren's St Paul's as 'the finest piece of urban scenography ... but please don't call it architecture'.[9] For Banham, St Paul's serves as a picture of urbanism but does not operate urbanistically or architecturally. Wren is contrasted not only to Hawksmoor but also to the strictly architectural Mies, who operates at the level of organization and 'rational explanation'.

English landscape architecture is, to his eye, similarly scenographic, like a portrait of a landscape but almost without exception a purely retinal resemblance rather than an original artwork in its own right. Just as a designer copies architectural order by making a picture of that order rather than operating within it, a landscape designer attempts to depict a landscape painting. It is for this reason that Banham cannot accord landscape design the status of artistic discipline. And it is even more problematic than architectural design, since that which Wren copied was architecture as model of natural order, while that which landscape design attempts to imitate is itself a resemblance, a painting. As a second-generation copy, landscape design appears as a simulacrum of a discipline. Though he does not put it in such terms, for Banham such simulacral practice can only be a false ethics.

The Operative Landscape

Banham's portrayal of landscape articulated a general intuition in architectural discourse. Reacting to the suspicion of its relationship with painting, landscape design has attempted to purge its pastoral and pictorial referents. In a recent article, Alex Wall argued that 'the term landscape no longer refers to prospects of pastoral innocence but rather invokes the functioning matrix of connective tissues that organized not only objects and spaces but also the dynamic processes and events that move through them'.[10] He further argues the need for this shift because the 'nature of the city' itself has become unprecedentedly formless, dynamic and complex. The objects of traditional architectural knowledge, he suggests, have been supplanted by undifferentiated expanses of surface organization. Wall concludes that one reason landscape is especially useful is its emphasis on the plan and the horizontal as an ordering surface: 'all things come together on the ground'.[11]

Yet how different is this from Le Corbusier's plan as generator of order? We should recall architecture's vast self-appointment as model for rational thought or natural order. A central

9 Banham (1996), p. 299.
10 Alex Wall, 'Programming the Urban Surface', in *Recovering Landscape*, James Corner, ed. (Princeton Architectural Press: 1999), p. 223.
11 Wall (1999), p. 247.

part of its status as model, as Banham's case reveals, is that architecture does not simply represent things but operates at the level of organization itself. That is to say, architecture is thought not to represent or be a picture of order but to serve as a model for order. If the nature of the city has changed, landscape is now being offered as a replacement model of order. To posit a shift to landscape design on the grounds that it allows access to the reality or new nature or essence of the city replays what has always been claimed as the task of architecture. The supposed shift to the operational attempts to recover landscape from its pictorial and innocent pastoralism, while leaving architecture and planning's underlying assumptions – namely, a deep suspicion of pictorial representation as simulacrum – intact. Thus, elevating landscape design to the status of model by stripping it of its problematic past merely conserves the ethics of an architecture based on the model-copy, in which it is urban design's task to copy the natural order of the city.

Landscape as General Theory

In any case, we can see how the recent reclaiming of landscape design from simulacrum to model is poised around two seemingly incompatible understandings. The first treats landscape as representation, depiction, mimesis and resemblance; the other concerns territory, encoding, transformations and dynamics. One is landscape as painted, the other landscape as occupied by forces and gang warfare. However, this division of landscape is inherently unstable. James Corner has argued that landscape inevitably entails both aspects as an eidetic projection of possibility.[12] But is it a visual (or other sensory) image of landscape that is being projected or something else that allows our recovery of landscape as an image of design practice?

Take, for example, Sanford Kwinter's seminal 1992 article 'Landscapes of Change'.[13] This text situates Umberto Boccioni's triptych *Stati d'animo* (1911) within the more recent epistemology of catastrophe theory and embryology. By reintroducing architecture to morphogenesis and nonlinear science, this article was central to the emergence of landscape design as a new mode for architectural practice. Kwinter described Boccioni's paintings as 'modal' landscapes of 'spatiotemporal' loci, intensities and forces, and in his conclusion argues for a renewed 'modal' approach to design. This modal design implicitly offers different

12 James Corner, 'Eidetic Operations and New Landscape', in *Recovering Landscape*, Corner, ed. (1999).
13 Sanford Kwinter, 'Landscapes of Change: Boccioni's Stati Re-producing Landscape d'animo as a General Theory of Models', in *Assemblage* 19 (1992), pp. 52–65.

ways of approaching reality and representation alike (opposed to the 'hylemorphic' and Platonic sensibilities of classical, and much of modernist, aesthetics). Part of this modal design is what Greg Lynn would later call an 'ethics of the animate', which takes the dynamic and the multiple rather than the static and the whole as premises of order.

Throughout the article this mode is defined through landscape, which operates as both an explicit trope and an operative strategy. It functions discursively as an analogy to topology, both surface organizations rife with heterogeneous transformations and multiplicity. Ontologically, two specific scientific models are analysed as event landscapes: Conrad Waddington's 'epigenetic landscape' and René Thom's 'catastrophe surface of capture'. Both of these subsequently became leitmotivs of architectural discourse. Epistemologically, it is as an analogous landscape of change, or more specifically Lucretian morphogenesis, that Kwinter diagrams Boccioni's painting. At the discursive level, therefore, landscape operates as a diagrammatic machine by which diverse fields of knowledge may be diagrammed upon a single surface. It was this 'general theory of models' as morphogenetic landscape that architecture attempted to emulate for the next ten years.

Yet while Kwinter employed landscape as operational mode, he also employed another sensibility of landscape, the representational and pastoral one. The argument, especially in its use of landscapelike images, is presented largely by asserting the resemblance of the painting to natural and scientific formations; processes of formation are dealt with extensively, but no link is made to Boccioni's process of painting. *Stati d'animo* is at once produced by a landscape modality and depicts such a landscape of 'transformational events'. The conclusion states that 'what we find depicted are three eventual complexes, or *three morphogenetic fields*', but also that 'each is *triggered* by a different singularity ... incarnating the multiple conflictual play of forces' [my emphasis].[14] Which is it? Painting produced by the triggering of events or painting depicting events that occurred elsewhere? A picture of a modality or a modality that produces new pictorial sensibilities? Indeed, for architecture the presentation of a painting as a general model might itself be seen as conflicting with the intended shift to modal rather than representational design practices.[15]

Such instabilities emerge from the inherent complexity built into landscape as a mode of design. This is as integral to the idea of *Stati d'animo* as a morphogenetic landscape as it is to

14 Kwinter (1992), p. 63.

15 It should be noted that the article was originally intended for and published within the institutions of the visual arts and only afterwards republished in *Assemblage* as 'important for the journal's emerging programme' (Editor's note, p. 52). In that regard, the difficulty I am pointing out emerges in the article's appropriation.

Waddington's picturing of morphogenesis as a landscape. In fact, contemporary scientific discourse is populated with a litany of such tropes: Waddington's 'epigenetic landscapes', Kaufman's 'fitness landscapes', Thom's 'catastrophe landscapes', Uexhil's 'environmental capture'. In these sciences, an ethos of landscape offers an aesthetic schema for a different ontology in which it becomes possible to formalize different types of existence, different sorts of objects and new relationships between them. It is not simply that the material nature of cities has changed; these changes are perceptible and conceptualized as such only because of a reconfiguration in our formal schema of existence. Likewise, it is not simply that the objects of architectural knowledge have become dynamic surfaces of multiplicity, but that the aesthetic of the surface has become an epistemological site for reconfiguring architectural ethics. Landscape becomes possible as a mode of urban design only within this specific configuration of concepts, conditions and cross-disciplinary practices.

To understand this complexity in the image of landscape and to avoid reducing it either to a natural phenomenon or a sensorial representation, we might refer to its genealogy within modern aesthetic theory. In one of his early works, Walter Benjamin formalized their relationship: 'We should speak of two cuts through the world's substance, the longitudinal cut of painting, and the transversal cut of certain graphic productions. The longitudinal cut seems to be that of representations, of a certain way it encloses things. The transversal cut is symbolic, it encloses signs.'[16]

As Rosalind Krauss has noted, this formulation has pervaded the discourse of modern art and visual theory, traceable from Benjamin through Clement Greenberg and Leo Steinberg.[17] In art theory, the longitudinal cut is treated as the vertical, and the transversal as the horizontal. We can see that, under such a formulation, landscape painting offers a vertical representation of that which is organized along the transversal plan of signs.

Such a distinction is a convention of architectural drawing: the vertical facade and the transversal plan. However, here it is not a matter of simply contrasting horizontality with verticality; these cuts do not determine what can occur upon them in an essentialist manner. Instead, they mark two different modalities. Steinberg, for example, contrasted the printer's horizontal flatbed, in which slugs of letters are set, with the vertical canvas of easel painting. For Douglas Crimp the exploitation of a flatbed printing technique by artists like Rauschenberg

16 Walter Benjamin, 'Peinture et graphisme', *La Part de l'oeil*, no. 6 (1909), p. 13.
17 Rosalind Krauss, 'Horizontality', in *Formless: A User's Guide*, Yves-Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss (Zone Books: 1997), pp. 93–4.

allowed the deterritorialization of painting from its historical identity as a discipline.[18] Here Benjamin's distinction of axis is combined with his thesis on art and mechanical reproduction.[19] The transversal is not simply the plane of signs in terms of the text but also the plane of machinic operation, inscription and reproduction. Clearly, it is the rotation of landscape onto the horizontal that is put on the table by Wall and many others.

This same dialectic of horizontality and verticality also operates in Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*. In this text, the vertical is aligned with the portrait. The face, or the mode of representation they call faciality, is a model to be copied, a picturesque machine to be replicated; difference is understood as deviance. It was not just Freud who argued that verticality is crucial to the essence of the human; humanism and culture have traditionally been aligned with verticality, especially in phenomenology and cognitive science. Being human – that is, being a humanist subject – is to be identified, portrayed, on the vertical axis. We might make this more general however and state that all identification – racial, gender, epistemological and ontological – occurs in the vertical mode of the portrait. The vertical is the axis of the model and the copy.

Moreover, in one of their rare explicit references to architecture, Deleuze and Guattari continue to define its praxis as the 'positions it ensembles – houses, towns or cities, monuments or factories – to function like faces in the landscape they transform'.[20] As with many of their observations on architecture, this is highly conventional; one recalls the Villa Savoye roofscape, in which a rectangular cutout 'frames' a view of the surrounding countryside into a 'landscape'. This is an architecture of discrete objects and isolated monuments. Nevertheless, we can see that this architecture is also the frame by which the landscape as deterritorialized longitudinal cut becomes conceptually 'rotated' into a pictorial landscape. Like Georges Bataille, who defines architecture as anthropomorphic per se, Deleuze and Guattari treat architecture as the model of faciality and verticality. Architecture is the model Oedipus, the mark of identity, the portrait of the 'same'.

However, Deleuze and Guattari argue, 'The face has a correlate of great importance: the landscape, which is not just a milieu but a deterritorialized world.'[21] If the vertical face is aligned with the humanist subject, then the horizontal landscape is the mode for all of their processes of anti-Oedipalization: the 'body without organs', the 'becoming animal', the

18 Rauschenberg famously printed text, images from art history, industry and various detritus onto a single surface. For Crimp, it is a heterotopia in the most literal sense, a landscape upon which the most incongruous elements exist in a coherent (but not whole) organization. Because they were removed from any context or grand narrative, the transversal can function as the site of simulacra, the site for the proliferation of copies without a designating Oedipal model. Douglas Crimp, 'On the Museum's Ruins', in *Postmodern Culture*, Hal Foster, ed. (Pluto Press: 1985). We might make an informative comparison between Boccioni and Rauschenberg. Boccioni's work remains within a tradition of easel painting and the pictographic. It remains literally and conceptually oriented along the vertical-longitudinal axis but attempts to articulate operations which occur upon the horizontal-transversal. On the other hand, Rauschenberg's combines and flatbeds are oriented along the transversal-horizontal but re-present longitudinal-vertical representations. The latter are transformed from pictures into informational signs that can be freely recombined. As Crimp argued, Rauschenberg's surfaces are archaeological sites in which representations and pictures are transformed into graphic and diagrammatic events defined by collision, superposition, blending, merging. Further, they employ the technology, concepts and techniques of media and mechanical reproduction to unfold new formal, spatial and aesthetic potentials. Like Pollock's *Deep Fathom Five* or Warhol's *Dance Diagrams*, Rauschenberg's work emerges from an encounter with painting as a discipline aligned on the vertical with the practices of the transversal. We might say they are not painted depictions of landscapes, either conceptual or pictorial, but events in which painting becomes or encounters the axis of transversal landscape.

19 It is important to differentiate the flatbed from collage. For no matter how similar they may appear, the cubist collage retains the 'longitudinal' mode in that disparate fragments are reassembled into a picture. In Rauschenberg's flatbeds, so it goes, something different is at stake: longitudinal representations are transformed into transversal marks, a type of *écriture*. Rauschenberg's flatbeds thus remain 'horizontal', that is, their mode is always transversal whatever their literal orientation.

20 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Athlone Press: 1988), p. 172.

21 Deleuze and Guattari (1988), p. 172.

rhizome, nomadology, the war machine. In any case, landscape plays a central role in their project to 'reverse Platonism' by allowing simulacra – those things which have no model and which do not operate according to a logic of resemblance – to rise up against their masters, the model and the copy. These new simulacra can produce new subjectivities. Think of Kafka's machines in *In the Penal Colony*, or masochism, which Deleuze and Guattari examine as deterritorialization of the vertical body into a transversal site of intensity and desire, a body without organs. The masochist does not attack the body, they argue, but the Oedipalized image of the body, its vertical representation. But this is an extreme case. 'One need not literally deface the image of a body in order to attack the verticality of axis the body shares with culture: it was enough to attack the axis itself to undermine the two together', writes Krauss.[22] Through such a transversal mode, the subject is transformed into a landscape of difference rather than a portrait of identity. Could they also be productive of new subject matters?

This is in fact how Krauss reads the move towards the horizontal-transversal axis: as an undermining of the traditions of mimetic representation based on models, copies and truth. An art based on the horizontal-transversal is central to her and Yves-Alain Bois' reworking of Bataille's *l'informe*. In the otherwise heterogeneous examples of Pollock's *Deep Fathom Five* and Warhol's *Piss Painting*, Krauss detects a singular transversal modality. For Krauss, the rotation of the 'image from the axis of the vertical and into the horizontal' is a 'powerful weapon' against the gestalt and the Oedipalization of humanist representations.[23] Similarly against architecture, Deleuze and Guattari see the potential of painting as 'the deterritorialization of faces and landscapes, either by a reactivation of corporeality, or by the liberation of lines or colours, or both at the same time'.[24]

Remembering architecture's investment in the unified body as model, and upon which the city as a designed object and object of design knowledge was supposedly modelled, we might propose that its recent encounter with landscape design is not unlike a masochism which operates at the level of the discipline. A masochism upon a 'body of knowledge'. Through landscape, architecture attempts to transform its body-model and its status as a model, to deterritorialize its own representation and self-image into a landscape upon which new intensities might be unfolded and desires discovered. Architecture and urbanism would then not simply fashion landscapelike plans or pay formalist homage to 'bodies without

22 Krauss (1997), p. 103.
23 Krauss (1997), p. 103. For this reason, Greenberg insists that only when Pollock's paintings are rotated onto the vertical surface of the gallery wall are they recuperated into the tradition of painting. Before that they are 'base material' rather than 'art'.
24 Deleuze and Guattari (1988), p. 172.

organs' but begin to operate and intervene according to a transversal mode. Moreover, if mechanical reproduction and graphic concepts were central to the advent of transversal paintings, the use of digital visualization and information technology in landscape urbanism should be understood as similar transversal operations in design, ones that may perhaps no longer be limited to these two axes and instead suggest as yet untheorized – that is to say, yet-to-be-pictured – modes of operation. Landscape cannot offer a new model of urbanism or architecture, only a new mode of operation. The proposition of landscape urbanism thereby attempts to rotate architecture out of its vertical alignment as a model of order, to deterritorialize in the first instance not the physical space of the city but the discipline's precepts and ethos. We might then say that the transdisciplinary project of landscape urbanism is an attempt to displace the traditional ethics of architecture based on the model-copy and to cultivate an architectural ethics of simulacrum.[25]

25 Architecture as simulation had been proposed previously by Peter Eisenman, in 'The End of the Classical', though in that piece the simulacra retain a negative connotation. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Bataille's *l'informe* emerged in architecture ten years ago, with Eisenman and Greg Lynn's attempt to develop an architecture of 'writing' that would displace representation and projective geometry with inscriptions of traces, indices, forces. In the wake of this project – which was largely abandoned before its accomplishment – architecture has adopted a projective rather than critical rhetoric. One reason landscape is useful is that its problematically pictorial overtones prevent the creeping realism, mimesis and objectivism that characterizes much of this discourse.